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IRC and the Pakistan earthquake: 8th October – 16th October 2005.All times within this report are approximate. Local time is shown for the location of the team and GMT is shown beside in brackets. Saturday 8th October.At approximately 0708hrs (0608hrs GMT.) a call was received by Willie McMartin from DFID. It stated that a large earthquake of approx 7.4 – 7.6 had struck Pakistan. Damage was reported in Islamabad and into the North of the Kashmir area. Some reports as yet unconfirmed of people killed and trapped. The above information was passed to the Operational Committee, with the decision being taken to immediately inform the group organisers. This was carried out by approximately 0745hrs (0645hrs GMT). Over the next few hours all availabilities were recorded and various calls to assess the information available were placed. By 1140hrs (1040hrs GMT) it was decided that the mission would probably be a go and that the time scales for mobilisation would be short. The likely departure point would be Stansted and as such consideration should be given to the travelling time. All regions were informed that the decision to start the IRC mobilisation, south to Stansted had been taken by the Operational Committee. This was only an IRC decision at this time as still no official mobilisation had been received. Water supplies and prophylactics were obtained and the movement of equipment was put into place. By approximately 1203hrs (1103hrs GMT) all the team were mobilised to meeting places or to Stansted Airport. At approximately 1300hrs (1200hrs GMT) confirmation that the mission was a go was received from DFID. By 1350hrs (1250hrs GMT) the destination for the team was changed to East Midlands Airport and all those in transit were informed. At 1410hrs (1310hrs GMT) the team members from Scotland had met at the admin office and then left for East Midlands where the estimated time for booking in was to be 1800hrs (1700hrs GMT). Ray Gray was the first to arrive at the airport and he established contact with the DHL staff on duty. They would be responsible for ensuring the departure time and processing of equipment and personnel. By 1800hrs (1700hrs GMT) the last of the team from Scotland arrived and all the equipment was booked in. Some additional teams from the Fire Service were still due, but the flight times were put back due to the late arrival of the inbound aircraft. By 1830hrs (1730hrs GMT) all IRC team members were airside. By 2310hrs (2210hrs GMT) the team from DFID had arrived and a team leaders briefing was held. The following organisations would travel on the flight:- DFID team. (Support and control the rescue effort). This added to a total of 78 persons and 4 SAR dogs. It was hoped that the team would be met in Islamabad by Mark Bulpitt and staff from the High Commission. They should have arranged onward transport. It was reported that mines could be a serious threat within the areas we may be deployed (Kashmir). Other problems may come from Al-Qaeda and or criminal activity such as kidnap or looting. Car bombs and the volatile nature of the area are also to be a major consideration. Military escorts should be available at all times. Night work would probably not be allowed and only travel in convoy would be safe. Sunday 9th October 2005.0010hrs (2310hrs GMT) the incoming plane has landed but it requires a fresh crew and fuelling. 0205hrs (0105hrs GMT) and all are on board but due to a problem with the flight plan departure is still delayed. The idea was to fly the most direct route over Iran and Afghanistan but the required special permission was holding up the clearance of the plane. 0305hrs (0205hrs GMT) push back and after a short delay and taxi we take off. 1030hrs and we change the time to 1430hrs (0930hrs GMT). 1447hrs (0947hrs GMT) Landed and taxi to the arrival stand. By 1530hrs (1030hrs GMT) the team has cleared immigration, the equipment is unloaded and arrangements for onward transport by helicopter to Kashmir are in hand. Most who arrived on the flight from the UK will work in the same locality. It is proposed that 2 flights of 4 helicopters will take place with the remaining personnel and equipment following the next day. Willie, Ray, Alexander, Dave L and Julie would be on the first flight. Dave E, Annie, Helen, John B and Ian would follow on the second flight. Robert, John A, Sheena and John W would ensure the safety of the equipment and would travel on the next day. The team were to be taken to the area with the largest reported loss of life, Muzaffarabad. 1635hrs (1135hrs GMT) and the first section to move forward have boarded a HUGH1E helicopter and are ready to go. 1650 hrs (1150hrs GMT) and the engine is started. They are accompanied by the military adviser from the High Commission, who is a serving marine officer. They are advised that this should be a 40 minute flight at around 500ft. 1651 (1151hrs GMT) Sections 2 and 3 have all equipment cleared and ready for deployment with next section forward or as required. 1659hrs (1159hrs GMT) and section 1 take off for very enjoyable flight. As they near the area they see that many villages are all but totally destroyed and that the city has huge areas totally flattened. 1730hrs (1230hrs GMT) Section 3 takes the equipment to the diplomatic compound whilst section 2 remain at the airport ready for their flight to the disaster zone. Section 1. 2100hrs (1600hrs GMT) Section 3 has secured 60 litres of petrol. A meeting is held with the Fire Service where the decision is taken that food, water and shelter must be moved forward to the first sections deployed. Communications are also to be a priority. Section 2 remain at the airport as the flight has been delayed until 0700hrs (0200hrs GMT) tomorrow. Section 1. Monday 10th October 2005.0005hrs (1905hrs GMT 9th Oct) the car has returned and all the team are safely back at the base camp. A meeting is held with Rob Holden, UN Coordinator at which the rescue operation is discussed. As a non rescue person he asks for general advice and guidance on technical matters. He is hopeful to deploy this section again prior to 0600hrs (0100hrs GMT). Having travelled light the section are living out of day bags. 0400hrs (2300hrs GMT) Section 3 depart for the airport and join up with section 2. Section 1. 0830hrs (0330hrs GMT) Section 2 take off for Muzaffarabad. Section 1. 0915hrs (0415hrs GMT) Section 2 arrive in Muzaffarabad and make their way to join up with section 1 at base camp. They were met at the airfield by Rob Holden of the UN and noted that a functioning OSOCC had been established. Section 1. 1000hrs (0500hrs GMT) Section 2 is deployed to the Number 1 Pilot High School on the far side of Muzaffarabad. On arrival they were met by locals who spoke good English, but unfortunately the driver refused to stay and took the transport away from the site. This was a single storey building and parents reported hearing voices recently, which was to be approximately 18 hrs prior to the sections arrival. 900 – 1200 pupils had been in the structure at the time of collapse. Section 1. Section 2. Section 1. The UN have found a more suitable area to utilise as a base camp for all rescue teams and IRC will move to this new location which is approximately 1km from the helicopter pad. The move was carried out by 1400hrs (1100hrs GMT) but without equipment it would be hard for the section to claim and keep an area if other teams arrive. Hygiene is also a problem as dog dirt covers the entire location. Some members from other teams had covered the dirt with large stones but this only compounded the problem as these stones had to be removed to pitch the tents. The section should have been deployed to search the K G SCHOOL and the DCI HEALTH BUILDING. This did not happen due to the lack of available transport. 1800hrs (1300hrs GMT) Section 3 arrives at base camp with most of the heavy equipment. A few boxes have had to be sent by road and will arrive as and when they do. All the team and most of the equipment had arrived at the new base camp and IRC have established their location. Potable water was in short supply so IRC instituted its normal conservation policy. No washing in water, baby wipes etc to be used. Water used for heating meals to be used for drinks. Hot pans of water to be turned off to reduce waste as steam. A new supply of bottled water should be available soon? 1900hrs (1400hrs GMT) the first of the regular team leaders meetings with the UN took place. THW(Austria/Germany) have a team of 50, Turkish teams with 87 members, AKUT have 17, UK have 62, and Emercon of Russia have 27 on locations in or around the town. It was also believed that RAPID UK had a team working with a local Pakistan team but numbers are not available as they are not at the start of the meeting. It was reported that fuel for equipment would be made available and that the military authorities would ensure transport with drivers was available soon. 11 live casualties had been located and rescued by international teams within the first 24hrs. 2100hrs (1600hrs GMT). IRC is asked to provide 2 large sections to go out to priority sites as supplied by the General in charge. The team splits into 2 sections with Ray leading 1 and Rab leading the 2nd. Willie will tag along to see what the priority sites are and try to gauge how much help the military will be. 2135hrs (1635hrs GMT) an Army Officer arrives and informs us that the transport is available and that both sections will travel by bus to the military hospital. 2200hrs (1700hrs GMT) all are at the ward opposite the Para Medical Centre. We were met by the hospital director who informs Brigadier Saleem that no one is alive within this area. After a long discussion which we were not included in, Brigadier Saleem requests that one section work in this location and that he can walk the other section to other locations. Rays section start work whilst Rab's section moves to the Old Campus University Boys School. Section 3. Military Hospital Psychiatric Unit. Section 1. Tuesday 11th October 20050003hrs (1903hrs GMT) only bodies were located. 0030hrs (1930hrs GMT) work stopped and the section start back to meet up with Section 3. 0035hrs (1935hrs GMT) the two sections meet up and make their way to the transport and return to base camp. 0230hrs (2130hrs GMT) a team leaders meeting has been called for 0700hrs (0200hrs GMT). During the night a few gunshots had been heard with a very few rounds passing close to the camp. It was believed that these had been strays rather than aimed shots. There was however a danger from them which would be reported to the UN and DFID at the team leaders meeting. The Russian Airmobile arrived while the team was out and Vladimir is the team leader. It is good to see him. The team leaders' meeting was informed that 18,800 were reported dead at that time. The scale of the incident in geographical and human size was growing beyond all original estimates. The position of supply for fuel and water to the base camp was under review with the authorities. Following last nights PR exercise no new tasks had been issued by the military and so the area would be split into zones and worked as such. Camp security had been placed in the hands of the local police who would supply armed guards and try to keep the population from entering the area. Rapid assessment forms were being produced based on a copy used at the tsunami. Although not perfect it was all that was available and all teams were asked to produce forms for all locations visited. The next meeting should be at 1800hrs (1300hrs GMT). Due to the incompatibility of radio systems IRC would supply the OSOCC with 6 hand held vhf radios. These would be given to teams as they left to work within the city. It was also hoped that a simple modification to the DFID base camp mast would boost the signal strength. 1800hrs (1300hrs GMT) the team leaders meeting was informed that the police were now positioned around the camp and the UN believed security was no longer a concern. Communications with teams on the ground was however a concern. The IRC vhf sets were working but it had not been possible to convert the DFID mast. This had reduced the effective range to approx 2 km. All teams were asked to try and ensure sat comms were available if working beyond this range. A fuel delivery will occur between 1400 – 1600hrs (0900hrs – 1100hrs GMT) each day when a bowser would arrive on site. All to draw supplies required at this time. The camp toilets were severely under pressure. It was hoped to try and get a local to clean and maintain them but all were reminded of their responsibility in this matter. Arrangements were being made to dispose of the camp rubbish. It should be bagged and deposited at a location near to the gate. Tasks from the local military were slowing down to almost nothing and as such it was agreed to continue self tasking from the grid system. It looked likely that the SAR may wind down within the next 24hrs and in that case it would be first in, first out. The UN resident coordinator had toured the city today and passed on his thanks to all teams. He indicated that there was no time to waste as a possible second disaster could occur if massive aid was not supplied now. Geneva had launched an appeal for $320,000,000 to cover the next 4 months. International donors would supply a support module which should arrive and take over the longer term coordination. Medical teams are reported to be on the way and tents etc should start to arrive tomorrow. All this, it was stated, had only been possible due to the efforts from the SAR teams and the profile they had built up. In excess of 100 casualties were at the heliport for evacuation to Islamabad. Concern was raised that some buildings were still not being marked. This was leading to double work. A greater concern was that of medical staff carrying out inoculations without records which could mean some locations being done twice or even more. The dangers from this were self evident and greater care had to be taken to record all locations. The use of GPS was required to pinpoint exact locations of buildings searched rather than by so called addresses. 0900hrs (0400hrs GMT) A section was requested for deployment with the team from Lincolnshire Fire Service. They would go to the market area of the town. Dave would deploy his section and take Anne Marie as a medic due to reports of large numbers of injured within the area. A request for a member to form part of a UN assessment team was also required at this time. Ray would carry out this function. 10.00hrs (0500hrs GMT) and most of the team were out. Ray was being sent out by the UN to do some building assessments in parts of the town that have not yet been reached with two other people from different teams. 11.10hrs (0600hrs GMT) and the assessment team are finally ready to go. Ray has been given three members of BIRD plus one member of Canis along with their dog and a nurse. Below are the details of the assessments. Base co ordinance 34-21 North 073-20 East First Location Second Location Third Location Fourth Location Whilst Ray was doing this one of the team from BIRD decided to do a live interview with the BBC (Ray had declined because we were supposed to be doing a reconnaissance) which delayed the assessment team for about 20 minutes. Following this they went up a mountain road which should have taken them up the side of the valley. It was quite badly damaged in places and had been affected by land slides. At this time the weather was beginning to deteriorate and it looked like they were going to get some heavy rain. It was decided to leave the vehicle and walk along the road for a while. When about half a mile from the jeep heavy rain started.. This soon turned to hail stones and by the time they returned back to the vehicle they were all soaked. It was decided to get off the mountain due to the risk of further land slides and return to base. Arrived back at base at 14.30hrs (0930hrs GMT) where all findings were reported to the UN. 1110hrs (0615hrs GMT) A second section was requested to attend at a reported live find in the town. The section stood by for over 2 hrs and then stood down due to lack of transport and/or confusion over where the request had been received from by the OSOCC. This type of event is common due to confusion over addresses, language problems, poor radio communications and also due to the general confusion and frustration. Section 1 returned from the market area at 1230hrs (0730hrs GMT) and reported that the area was very unstable. Many bodies had been located but no live finds. Described it as a nice walk. During the afternoon approximately 6 inches of rain fell within 90 minutes. This flooded our camp but was a mini disaster for those in the streets who had no shelter. It could also be observed that on the hills around this had fell as snow further hampering access to the areas and making conditions almost intolerable for the local population. Once again during the night watch a few gunshots had been heard with a very few rounds passing close to the camp. It was believed that these had been strays rather than aimed shots. There was however a danger from them which would be reported to the UN and DFID at the team leaders meeting. Wednesday 12th October 2005.0600hrs (0100hrs GMT) IRC is requested to have 2 sections available at 0700hrs (0200hrs GMT) to travel by helicopter to outlying villages. They will work with team members from other units. As all want to take part a draw for places was held. First section, Willie, Dave L, Helen, Zander and Dave E, the second section, Ray, Annie, Julie, John B, John W. 0700hrs (0200hrs GMT) both section are ready and transport arrives almost on time.0745hrs (0245hrs GMT) both sections are away to the heliport where they are briefed and teamed with THW and I S A R. The first section is on the apron with THW and are to leave on the first flight. Brigadier Saleem briefs them that they will be sent to Gharhi Dopattia which is a small town surrounded by small villages, many of which are in the hills and inaccessible other than by foot. Gharhi Dopattia has a landing site for helicopters and the surrounding area is sending the injured to that location for evacuation. 0830hrs (0330hrs GMT) the section are still on the apron as the helicopters tasked for this mission have not arrived. 1100hrs (0600hrs GMT) the helicopter is in attendance and the section are on board with 4 soldiers but it has no fuel. A small pump and some drums arrive and some is squirted onto the ground to prime the pump. This is directly beside the aircraft and does cause concern. They take a sample and test it, (sniff and rub into hands, to ensure it is the correct grade for the aircraft). 1110hrs (0610hrs GMT) Fuelled but the plan changes and the 5 THW, one of whom is a doctor replace the soldiers. 1115hrs (0615hrs GMT) finally start up and away. 1130hrs (0630hrs GMT) Arrive at Gharhi Dopattia and meet with the military commander in the area. He is asked if there are any locations where live casualties are still trapped. He advises that no locations are known to him but that some may be in outlying areas. Transport is arranged for the IRC section to travel to the hills whilst THW will support the doctor in treating casualties at the landing site and will also try to check any locations within the town. When travelling through the town it is noted that some of the shops are open and that food is still available. The driver and his companion ask if body recovery is a priority as there are many dead still buried. They are informed that it is the living who are the priority at this time. The first location visited is Awanpatti which is totally destroyed. In Awanpatti they state that 70 were killed in the school, 65 injured, many serious with 4 dead in the next building, 16 are alive of which 7 are injured. Water is being collected from rainfall. Shelter and blankets are the most urgent need but food will be critical soon. Similar damage is found in Bundadaigaim. In Bundadaigaim locals state that no one is trapped but give the following figures for the assessment forms 374 dead and 610 injured. Injuries range from fractures, partial amputation, full amputation, internal injury and probably crush injury. The total population in the area is 6,000 and no food stores are left in the area. Shelter and blankets are the most urgent need as winter is coming and this location has already had snow. Water is being collected from rainfall and some small streams are available in the area. A doctor had passed through the area but he had no supplies and could do nothing for the casualties. It was noted when the stream was visited that the women were washing some clothes which had been removed from some of the debris and also from some of the casualties. Sultanpur. Bandi Hajam. Garhi Dopatta. 08.15hours (0315hrs GMT) Ray’s the section are now at the airfield waiting for the helicopter. The primary function is to carry out an assessment of the villages that they are going to. The section has been paired up with a German team called International Search and Rescue (ISAR). They have been given a brief regarding the possibility of receiving a hostile reception. The military are very nervous and are insisting that the team go with a number of armed guards to accompany them. 11.00hrs (0600hrs GMT) still at the airport. There were some problems with the helicopters but they are hoping to be on their way by 12.00hrs (0700hrs GMT) 12.40hrs (0740hrs GMT) and they are finally in the air. They have been told the helicopter will be back at 15.45hrs (10.45hrs GMT) and they need to be back at the drop zone to meet it. If they miss it they could be left for some time. The flight only took about 15mins. It was a bit cramped with 11 on it (this included the one solider that had been sent to guard us). They landed at a small village in the mountains called Kahori. As they got off the helicopter Ray was approached by Volker Ziegler, the ISAR team leader, who said he was happy to place his team under Ray’s control. This was a big help. They were quickly surrounded by a large crowd who, although angry, were not hostile. A number of wounded people were being brought forward and they put some of those on to the helicopter to go back to Muzaffarabad. Once the helicopter had gone they tried to find someone who spoke English then tried to find the village elder. Ray spoke with him while they walked up to the village. They were advised that voices had been heard in a building and that some local people were working on clearing the rubble to locate them. He also said that a lot of children were trapped in a school. They eventually got to the building where the voices had been heard. They crawled in to the tunnel that the locals had made and called out. To their surprise two children’s voices shouted back. Ray split the team in two and sent a small joint group to check out the school and a joint team stayed to work on the live site. Because of the heat they would work in the tunnel in 20 minute shifts. When Ray was not in the tunnel he would do the assessment of the village. Annie and John W did a recce of the outside of the building. The building was a religious school and consisted of two floors which had pancaked. Like most of the village it had been built on a slope and was not the most stable of structures. There were other possible entry points but the existing tunnel seemed to offer the best chance. Julie, John B and two ISAR members have gone to recce the school. Julie returned from the school at about 14.00hrs (0900hrs GMT) and advised that all of the children in the school that did not get out were dead. From this point on they all concentrated on the tunnel. It was hard work and the building did move a lot particularly when a Chinook helicopter flew over it. They could have propped it but there was so much rubble underneath us that it would have taken a good hour or so to reach the floor to get a solid prop in because of this we decided to press on and take the risk. A Red Cross helicopter landed at the village and Ray sent Annie down to pass a message on to the pilot who in turn would pass it on to the UN. The message was: Have two confirmed live casualties trapped in building. We needed some cutting equipment and water. May not be able to return at 15.45hrs. More time needed to complete rescue. Annie made the dash to the Helicopter and not only passed the message but came back with two substantial first aid bags. The tunnel was difficult, more so as they did not have any cutting equipment. At 15.15hrs (1015hrs GMT) Ray decided to send a team member back with the helicopter to ensure a clear message got back to base. The rest of the team had decided to stay. They could not leave the two people in the building alive. Ray was initially going to send Julie back but after some discussion we decided to draw straws. Ray as section leader and Annie as medic had to stay so the draw was between Julie and the two Johns. John Brown drew the short straw and at 15.20 (1020hrs GMT) he took my message and went down to the landing area. The rest of the team then got on with the tunnel. They were really close to the children. They eventually reached them at 15.35hrs (1035hrs GMT). Both children were lying flat on a bed. The youngest one kept asking for a biscuit. There were actually three of them but the third one was dead. They recovered the two children and Annie checked them both over. One was covered in blood and we initially thought he was hurt but the blood was from his brother (the one who had died). One of the children was quite alert and glad to be out while the other, who had be lying next to his dead brother for nearly 4 days was quite traumatised. Their names and ages were Imran 14 years old and Maqbool who was 16 years old. They decided to take them both back with the team for medical treatment. Ray sent a runner down to John B and asked him to hold the helicopter when it landed as we were on our way down with two casualties. The rescue was a really good joint team effort between ourselves and ISAR. All of the team were on a high. They got down to the landing area to wait for the helicopter which was now late. There were a number of casualties around the landing area. Annie spoke to some of them and advised Ray that two of them needed to be evacuated as a matter of urgency. This may or may not be possible depending on the type of helicopter that came back for the team. It was Ray’s call and if he had to his priority would be to get the two teams back first. 16.00hrs (1100hrs GMT) still no sign of the helicopter. They have seen a number flying over us but none are heading their way. They decided to try to make contact with base via the radio and mobile. The radio did not work and neither did the mobile phone until John W by chance managed to pick up a signal in on particular spot. If he moved a foot either way they lost it. After a few attempts they managed to get a message through which included their position and status. They were advised that control would do their best to get them picked up but a number of the teams that had gone out had been attacked and they were the priority. They did a quick check to see what they had with them if they had to stop over night. Food and shelter were ok but the real problem was that they were running out of water. They had been sharing theirs with ISAR who had run out very quickly. The joint supply was down to around 8lts between 10. At the rate they had been losing fluid while working in the tunnel this could be a problem. Just as it was getting dark and they were resigned to the fact that they were going to be out over night a helicopter appeared. John marshalled it in and after some protest from the pilot they began to put on some of the wounded. They eventually took off with 8 casualties plus carers, 10 team members and 1 soldier. It is reported that it did struggle to get off the ground and the only place left for Ray to sit (as he was last on) was the doors at the back. When they landed the team got off but the casualties stayed on to go to Islamabad for treatment. A bus was waiting at the airfields to take them back to base. Once there Ray gave the following report to the UN: Village of Kahori They returned to the IRC base at 1750hrs (1250hrs GMT). 1810hrs (1310hrs GMT) the team leaders meet to discuss the day. The UN report that more transport is now available but that it is still not sufficient to meet all the needs. The German Military helicopters, which had now arrived and had started to operate in the area, will supply the air lifts for the next day to deploy and retrieve any away teams. It is agreed to change from SAR to health with tomorrows flights. A full meeting of health workers will take place tomorrow to discuss the needs. 4 live casualties had been located today but many were dying from untreated injury and the cold. All agreed to the Military being advised that SAR was coming to an end. 2200hrs (1700hrs GMT) A meeting of all UK team leaders is called by DFID and it is decided to withdraw tomorrow as the change to health will negate the need for rescue and as first in we could be first out. It is agreed that all small and large tents will be donated, some sleeping bags, tarpaulins and various other items may also be left. Thursday 13th October 2005.0530hrs (0030hrs GMT) the team are all packed and ready for the drive to Islamabad. Word comes that we will not be allowed to travel without a police escort as there is a possibility of problems on the road. It is confirmed that the road is open and that we have transport available at this time. 1000hrs (0500hrs GMT) It will not be possible to get away until after the visit from some very high ranking officials from the UN and the United States. Get ready for a long sit in the sun. By early evening it is apparent that the team will not travel today and also the lorry for the kit is leaving. All the kit is unloaded and arrangements are put into place to have replacement vehicles available tomorrow. 1800hrs (1300hrs GMT) A team leaders meeting is held by the UN. It is reported that the use of the trauma team idea was a great success. Even with the loss of one German helicopter due to mechanical problems, at least 75 lives were directly saved and the quality of treatment to many others had been enhanced. The idea would continue tomorrow with the United States being asked to supply additional medi vac helicopters. The OSOCC will now no longer deal with SAR but trauma and relief. It is expected that a heavy support module will arrive on Saturday. THW SAR team are leaving tomorrow along with the UK teams and one Turkish team has already driven to Islamabad. A request to supply a water system for the UN to keep a potable water supply available for the camp and oncoming aid workers was also put to the meeting. IRC will supply an Arctic Clear system. This would be set up and operated by members of the German team. 1900hrs (1400hrs GMT) UK team leaders meeting is held. Escorts have been guaranteed from both local and national police sources for the trip to Islamabad tomorrow morning. A replacement truck should arrive mid morning and departure should be as soon as possible after loading. Arrangements had been made for all to put up at the Commission and food would be available at the club. The flights home should be on Saturday by charter flight. Friday 14th October 2005.The team is ready to leave by 0430hrs (2330hrs GMT). 0700hrs (0200hrs GMT) one team member has picked up a bug and is suffering from diarrhoea. This is more inconvenient than a major problem. Some members of other sections of the UK team are also suffering and the doctor has stated that it will last for approx 24 – 48 hrs and is nothing to worry about. 0900hrs (0400hrs GMT). The trucks have arrived and are loaded, the 6 buses are available and all that is required is our police escort. 0920hrs (0420hrs GMT) the police are in attendance and have a vehicle in front, armed guards on each bus and a vehicle behind. 0932hrs (0432hrs GMT) the convoy pulls out from base camp on the road to Islamabad. The trip is generally uneventful other than the suicidal driving. 1545hrs (1045hrs GMT) the convoy arrives in Islamabad and makes its way to the diplomatic compound where they will stay overnight. All were treated well and the staff could not have been more helpful. Saturday 15th October 2005.0900hrs (0400hrs GMT) and the flight is on hold. 1000hrs (0500hrs GMT) the flight is approximately 5 hours late due to the incoming flight being late. The delay is due to problems getting a flight slot via Bahrain where aid flights are being given priority. 1320hrs (0832hrs GMT) the team depart to the airport. This takes approximately 40 minutes with a further 45 minutes to clear the security and immigration. The only problem at this point was caused by the OSOCC at the airport who demanded a note of all the locations where the UK teams had worked and also started to complain that one team had deployed to Islamabad, which they claimed was against some agreement. Told them that was not our team and they would get copies of reports from DFID in the fullness of time. 1705hrs (1205hrs GMT) All equipment has been loaded and everyone boarded. Take off was at 1735hrs (1235hrs GMT) and the flight home was without problems other than those caused by the personnel who were ill. The crew had asked that they use the rear toilet to try and keep any cross infection to a minimum. This request was not complied with and inside the first hour all toilets had been used. Sunday 16th October 20050135hrs (0036hrs GMT) Landed and the arrival process started. 0320hrs (0220hrs GMT) All IRC members have started the road journey home with the last group arriving by 1600hrs (1500hrs GMT). In closing this report, I feel that it must be stated that this was the most effective joint deployment to date. It was successful in saving life, it worked well with the UN on scene, it prove that organisations can work together. DFID had their role very well defined and worked with all the teams. Much of this is in fact due to the individuals present from all the organisations being able to work together. This comes from a general trust in others and also from knowing each other, their strengths and weaknesses. It is the hope of the International Rescue Corps that this will continue to develop in the future and that the few minor problems will be treated as minor and not be allowed to grow beyond learning points. Appendix 1: Abbreviations.BIRD: British International Rescue Dogs. Appendix 2 Learning Points From Mission.1) The culture of the county was not respected by some within the UK team. 2) On arrival it was apparent that water would become a problem. Not just for the UK teams but for all in the base camp and also for the local population. UK members were observed using water for washing, shaving and even just to cool down. Such waste is not acceptable. How would they feel if their family is struggling for water and they observe huge waste by those who have come to help. 3) Toilet facilities were not too good within the camp. This is understandable under the circumstances and it is up to organisations to deal with this problem. Simply walking to the rear of your tent IS NOT dealing with the situation. 4) The ability to respond as a light reconnaissance unit needs to be understood. The taking of large rucksacks with your creature comforts is not travelling light. 5) The time scale for moving the full command structure forward needs to be examined. A light unit with pen and paper at first then the full unit. When people are dying due to the lack of a disc cutter then bringing tents, computers etc as a priority is wrong. It has to be pointed out that as the time scale developed the command tend more than proved its worth. The OSOCC at this incident was undoubtedly the most efficient that we have worked with and credit for that goes jointly to the staff from the Fire Service and Rob Holden of the UN. 6) When transport was an issue, especially in the very early part of the deployment, some groups would not release a vehicle to move other units. If joint deployment is to continue to progress then this type of problem must be dealt with. 7) The need to develop a suitable idea for marking buildings must be looked at. Chalk washes off, spray paint cannot be taken on aircraft, wax crayon does not stick on sand etc. Whatever the eventual solution it must be carried by all sections from first deployment to try and reduce double, triple and more searching of buildings. 8) A assessment team should be that and not have nurses and search dogs as part of it. Its primary role is assessment and must not get bogged down with search work and media interviews. 9) When teams are sent out it is of paramount importance that ALL sections within the team take sufficient water and an emergency supply to see the trip and a safety margin to completion. Where possible a back up filter or treatment tablets must also be carried. |
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